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	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
	UNITED STATES of AMERICA,
	-against- 10 Cr. 510
	ANDREW BARTOK,
	Defendant.
	x
	United States Courthouse White Plains, New York
	April 5, 2012
1	Before:
	HON. CATHY SEIBEL, District Court Judge
	APPEARANCES:
	JOHN COLLINS JEFFREY ALBERTS Assistant United States Attorneys
	AMY ATTIAS Attorney for Andrew Bartok
	ANGELA A. O'DONNELL, RPR Official Court Reporter

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: United States of America against Andrew Bartok.

THE COURT: Have a seat everyone. Good morning Mr. Collins, Mr. Alberts, Mr. Burke, Ms. Attias and Mr. Bartok.

So I have Ms. Attias's motions and the Government's response thereto. And, as I understand it, the government is in agreement that Count Ten needs to be severed not because it's improperly joined but because, under Rule 42, a different judge should handle Count Ten?

MR. COLLINS: Your Honor, we believe, after consultation with people who are much more knowledgeable and smarter in my office, that pursuant to Rule 42(a)(3) the most prudent course of action in this case would be to have that count severed and then, if it's to be tried at a later date, to be tried by a different District Judge.

are smarter people in the office, but, yes, I looked at the rule and it seems to me what Count Ten charges is the failure to comply with an order, and I don't think that necessarily implies disrespect of criticism of the Court, and I actually just did a quick search and there is one case in the Eastern District of Tennessee saying as much. But if both parties are in agreement on something, I'm not going to

stand in the way. And it probably is, in an excess of

caution, the prudent course. And, who knows, maybe events

will develop such that the government decides it doesn't

need to pursue that count.

MR. COLLINS: We agree, your Honor. We don't,

MR. COLLINS: We agree, your Honor. We don't, just to make clear the Government's position, we don't, we believe that based upon, the only case we can find is the same one that I believe your Honor is referring to, Moncier.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. COLLINS: M-O-N-C-I-E-R, which the Sixth Circuit reversed based upon Rule 42.

THE COURT: But on different grounds.

MR. COLLINS: I thought they actually did reverse on the Rule 42(a)(3) grounds. So, as a result, that's sort of, given that *Moncier* is the only case out there, we believe it's, in terms of being prudent, that we've taken this position.

THE COURT: Well, that's fine. The motion to sever Count Ten is granted. Then this raises a practical question in my mind, which is, Count Eight sort of goes with Count Ten. Why not just sever Count Ten as well and then try those two separately?

MR. COLLINS: With regard to that point, your Honor, we don't actually, we respectfully have a different viewpoint, which is that the reason why we're agreeing to a

severance of Count Ten is statutory grounds, that we believe it's prudent pursuant to Rule 42(a)(3) which addresses that count on statutory grounds that it should be severed. Were there not to be Rule 42(a)(3), we would not be agreeing that there should be a severance of Count Ten. Especially in light of --

THE COURT: No, I understand. Your argument is both of the counts are properly joined under Rule 8. Count Ten is only leaving us because of Rule 42. But just as a practical matter, wouldn't it be sort of clean to send Count Eight off to another judge along with Count Ten?

MR. COLLINS: No, because as we argue in our brief, your Honor, even though Count Ten, even though we've agreed and your Honor has now ordered that Count Ten be severed, we take the firm position, your Honor, that the evidence supporting both counts, Eight and Count Ten, would be admissible in the trial of Mr. Bartok with regard to all the other counts. And since the evidence would be, since the evidence would be admissible and be heard before the jury, it simply doesn't make either sense from, in terms of judicial economy under Rule 14 or under Rule 8 since they're properly joined for Count Eight to be severed.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a legal question.

Whether the evidence would be admissible even if the count were severed is obviously an important factor under Rule 14,

but under Rule 8 aren't you supposed to look at the character of the offenses and not the fact that it might or might not be admissible?

MR. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor. And I think, if you do look at both, if you look at the counts, clearly Count Eight is of the same or similar character to other counts that are in the Indictment, just looking at the 1001 count, Count Eight charges that Mr. Bartok committed perjury, that he lied to the Court with regard to his assets in order to secure a CJA appointment. With regard to Count Six, your Honor, of S4, that alleges that Mr. Bartok made a false statement to the Bankruptcy Court, specifically he made a false statement to Judge Cecelia Morris. Clearly, just looking at those two counts alone, without the fact that essentially the purpose behind Count Eight is to commit a fraud, which is what a number of the counts address in S4, that count is, Count Eight is of the same or similar character. It's essentially —

THE COURT: It's a false statement.

MR. COLLINS: To the Court.

THE COURT: It's a false statement to a Court. I looked at the Government's cases, they all seem to involve perjury charges where, if perjury relates to the substantive counts at least to the extent that they involve the same entity. The Werner case, which is the one where the general

likeness comes in, it was a theft and it was a robbery, but it was from the same place and it was a place where the defendant worked. In Ruiz, it was a false loan application and perjury, but both arose from the defendant's operation of the same business. And in Josephberg it was a healthcare fraud, a nanny tax fraud and an income tax fraud, and the Court did say these are all dishonest acts to get money, but there was more. The healthcare fraud, as I read that case, involved falsely carrying the defendant's wife as an employee of a particular corporation so that she could get health coverage, and the income tax fraud involved hiding money in the same corporation. So there was some connection in that all the counts arose from the operation of the same entity. Here most of the counts arise from the operation of Revelations, but the false financial affidavit doesn't.

Are there cases where perjury is joined with other frauds or false statements where the only connection is really what we have here, which is a "but for" connection? Obviously but for the defendant's operation of Revelations, he wouldn't have been indicted, and but for being indicted he wouldn't have had to put in a financial affidavit. But it seems like the cases all had some connection beyond a "but for" connection or beyond just it was two lies or two frauds. It was two lies or two frauds that grew out of the same entity or the same business it seemed to me.

MR. COLLINS: Well, your Honor, the view that -- I understand your Honor's position. If I remember correctly, and I'm trying to find it now, one of the cases dealt with perjury concerning a bank, concerning a bank robbery. And here, actually, and I think there was the *Potamitis*.

THE COURT: That was where the perjury in the Grand Jury was to cover up the underlying crime.

MR. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor, but there's also that element here as well. Because, if you look at the affidavits, and part of the Government's proof with regard to Count Eight is that one of the things that Mr. Bartok lied about was the money that he actually earned from Revelations. In relying on the financial affidavit, he lies about what he earned during the preceding 12 months, which is relevant to the Government's case, because what Mr. Bartok was doing was, in the same manner that the conspirators with regard to the bankruptcy are trying to minimize or obfuscate what occurred previously, Mr. Bartok, in his affidavit, when he lies about how much money he earned during the previous 12 months, and there simply cannot be any dispute about that --

THE COURT: But you didn't charge that lie.

You've charged two lies: One that he didn't have any cash on hand or money in savings or checking; and, two, that he lied about the property he owned. You haven't charged that

he lied about his income in the previous 12 months.

MR. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor. But with regard to, again, that goes to the evidence that's going to be admitted at trial, with regard to Mr. Bartok's accumulation of assets and with regard to his cash on hand, the same bank records that the government would be using to prove the assets that Mr. Bartok accumulated during the course of his fraud and the money that he gained on hand and how he disposed of it, that's the income from Revelations.

THE COURT: Right. But you didn't charge him about lying about his income. I mean, if you've got evidence that, you're going to prove that he took in gobs of money from this business and that he spent gobs of money.

MR. COLLINS: Yes.

THE COURT: That would not be admissible on Count Eight because Count Eight doesn't charge him with lying about what he took in, it charges him with lying about what he had on the day of the affidavit.

MR. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So what he had on the day of the affidavit, unless you show that what he took in he still had on the day of the affidavit, I don't really follow it. The bank records that show he took gobs in and he spent gobs isn't going to prove what he had on hand on whatever the date was.

MR. COLLINS: March 15.

THE COURT: March 15, 2011. Right? I mean, it's two different -- if you had charged him with an additional lie on the financial affidavit in that he covered up income that he received in the previous 12 months from Revelations, your position would be stronger. But I don't see that.

MR. COLLINS: Well, I guess, your Honor, then we go back to clearly then under Rule 8 that Count Six and Count Eight of the same or similar character, they're lying to the Court.

THE COURT: I mean, I think you have even a stronger argument than that. I mean, Counts One through Four also involve lying to the Court because you've alleged that this whole scheme involved filing bankruptcies for clients that were full of false statements. False statements to Bankruptcy Courts are all over this case.

Is it enough that this is also a false statement to a Court as opposed to a false statement? I mean, there are cases where a defendant is charged with false statement to a bank and then a false statement to an investor and those get severed. Just because it's two dishonest things that the same guy allegedly did isn't enough to find they're a same or similar character.

Is the fact that here it's not just false statements to various people, it's false statement to the

1 | Court enough to make it same or similar character?

MR. COLLINS: Well, it's even more specific, your Honor, than false statements to courts generally. We're not even talking about a false statements to a state court and a false statement to a federal court, we're talking about two false statements to United States Judges.

THE COURT: Well, only one was an Article III,

Judge. I mean, I'm kidding. That would be slicing the

onion very thin.

MR. COLLINS: I think the administrative office of US Courts covers both the Bankruptcy Court Judges and the District Court Judges. I think would approach it -- even if I don't succeed under the Constitution, I would approach it through that statutory regime, your Honor.

THE COURT: We both get our paychecks from the federal government.

I mean, I think this is between the extremes.

It's not, you know, two random frauds that have nothing in common. False statements to courts are common to the two, but it's not the situation that other courts have found to pass muster under Rule 8 either where there was some connection between the false statement and the underlying crime either that the false statement was covering up that crime or the false statement arose from the operation of the same business. And Judge Robinson in the Kerik case, which

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I printed, does a fairly thorough analysis, and he says, let me find it, he says that the government is always quoting Ruiz and arguing that, as long as it involves substantial alleged dishonesty, that's enough. But Judge Robinson points out that the charges in Ruiz were more closely regulated than those in the Kerik case because they arose out of business dealings with a particular company. And in the Kerik case he severed tax, this is painted with a broader brush than the facts warrant, but basically Judge Robinson severed personal tax machinations from honest services fraud, and he basically says, you know, the Indictment's a laundry list of illegal schemes and false statements, the charges aren't related to all the others by time, actors, places or subject matters. The lone common link is the defendant himself, like an unpleasant episode of This is Your Life.

So the fact that it's the same defendant and it's the same kind of bad behavior, in other words, dishonest behavior, is not enough. Here you've got a little more in that it's not just generally dishonest behavior you're alleging, it's dishonest behavior accomplished by making false statements to federal courts. So I think you're in a slightly stronger position than in *Kerik* where the false statements were made to City authorities, to the White House, to the IRS, but you're not in as strong a position as

you would be if there were some substantive relationship between the conduct. I mean, the false statements in Counts One through Four and Count Six and Count Seven also were false statements that the defendant is alleged to have engineered, although they were ostensively made by the clients. And here the false statement is his. But aside from a "but for" connection, or, you know a connection you could have charged but you didn't, there isn't as much of a connection as in -- even as there was in Josephberg and that was I think pretty much the outer limits of what would be okay under Ruiz.

I also found a Seventh Circuit case called Alexander, which is even more of a stretch, this is not a good case for the defendant. It was reviewed under the plain error standard, which is not what I'm applying here, obviously, but in the Alexander case, which is 135 F.3d 470, the defendant had a business filing bankruptcies for people and there were four counts arising from false statements, and there are counts arising from his having defrauded his customers and made false statements to the Bankruptcy Court. Then there was a mail fraud count arising from a false insurance claim on the business's insurance where the guy falsely claimed that his business computer had been destroyed in an accident. There was a mail fraud claim arising from a false mortgage application for a building

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that contained the defendant's apartment out of which he ran the business, and there were seven counts of bankruptcy fraud relating to the defendant's personal bankruptcy, and the Seventh Circuit said it was fine to have them all together, not just because it was dishonest behavior by the same guy, but they said, and I think this is a stretch, that all of these offenses were designed to enhance the resources of the filing business. So the mortgage fraud got the defendant the apartment out of which he ran the business. The bankruptcy fraud arose from the operation of the business. The insurance fraud was an attempt to get money for the business, I didn't really see that, it seemed like it was an attempt to get money, and the personal bankruptcy fraud, their argument was that, well, those false statements prevented foreclosure of the premises out of which he ran the business, which I think is weak, but which I think is stronger is that in his personal bankruptcy he made false statements that concealed the existence of the filing business.

So particularly the false mortgage application seemed like a real stretch to me, but it was under the plain error standard. I'm not under the plain error standard.

And the Seventh Circuit in Alexander cited a bunch of out-of-circuit cases where the various frauds grew out of the same business, and they said, well, this all has to do

with the same business.

Can I say that here, Mr. Collins, can I say the financial affidavit was part of the business? I don't think I can. And do I have to?

MR. COLLINS: With regard to, related to running the business, your Honor, I would say, no, but you don't need to, our position under Rule 8 is that you don't need to find that his perjury, that his perjury was related to the operation of Revelations.

I understand your Honor's point. I mean, obviously, there are always going to be differences between different counts. Our position is that under Ruiz, as your Honor has cited, and with regard to it being of the same or similar character, that we honestly can see no difference between a lie to a United States District Judge during the course of a litigation and a lie to a United States

Bankruptcy Judge during the course of litigation. I can't honestly see how those are not of the same or similar character. They strike the government as literally of the same offense, except one is charged under 1001 and one charged under 1623, both have essentially the same elements, with the exception that under perjury it's made under oath, while under a 1001 it's also a false statement and it's a statement that's material.

I mean, the only difference between the two, the

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only difference between the two counts in this case is that 1623 requires that it be under oath, which 1001 doesn't.

Other than that, they're both false statements to federal judges in the same judicial district made during the course of litigation.

THE COURT: I mean, they're certainly of similar character in the colloquial sense, but it seems to me the case law, because similar character is sort of the thinnest read under Rule 8(a), tends to frown upon describing the offenses at such a general level of abstraction that, you know, they're similar, just because they involve dishonesty to make money or dishonesty to defraud, and they require something more than what Ruiz said, they required something more than substantial alleged dishonesty. Even Ruiz didn't say that that was enough. Ruiz said, the false loan application and the perjury before the Grand Jury were properly joined as offenses of similar character because both involved substantial alleged dishonesty and both arose from the defendant's activities through this particular entity called Alliance. The false loan applications were for projects that Alliance was attempting to do, and the perjury before the Grand Jury had to do with whether the state senate ethics committee had approved the defendant's activities in connection with that entity. So it wasn't just, even under Ruiz, substantial alleged dishonesty, it

was substantial alleged dishonesty and that the counts both 1 arose from activities in connection with the same entity. 2 MR. COLLINS: Well, but I guess that brings us 3 back to where we were before. I mean, essentially that goes 4 back to your Honor's "but for." But for the individuals 5 6 being involved in the bank robbery, they wouldn't be 7 testifying before the Grand Jury. 8 THE COURT: Right, but it's more than that. 9 false testimony in the Grand Jury was designed the cover up 10 the bank robbery. I mean, but for a million things. If 11 Bank Robber One had been, not in the bar the night that Bank 12 Robber Two was there, they never would have met and never 13 would have done the bank robbery. You can do a "but for" 14 analysis at a very general level of abstraction too. 15 Let me ask Ms. Attias, though: Isn't the 16 government right? 17 I mean, these are false statements to the Court, 18 how can that not be of similar character? 19 MS. ATTIAS: I was waiting to speak, Judge, 20 because you were making all my arguments, and I thought I 21 was doing quite well. 22 THE COURT: But the hardest one is the one I just asked you. How can I say they're not of similar character? 23 24 It's lying to a Court, allegedly.

MS. ATTIAS: Judge, where I think you have to put

your focus is on what the alleged lies were really about really underneath. All the other lies alleged in the Indictment have to do with the business; the running of the business, the alleged lying to the Bankruptcy Judge herself was all about the running of the business, that's how the business allegedly ran. This was completely separate in time. This had a completely different purpose. This was for having had two different attorneys before. The allegations in this count have to do with getting a lawyer without spending more money having had a massive change, Mr. Bartok having gone through a massive financial change over the time that the case was pending.

So, even if you even look at the reasons, the potential reasons behind the alleged untruths, it shows how completely unrelated they are. Many of them, all of them in the Indictment allege, have to do with his making money.

After he lost all that money during the course of the case, now he came to the point where he was applying to the Court for counsel that he didn't have to pay for, so that he wouldn't have to spend whatever he had left on new counsel.

So that's my answer to that, Judge. I don't think that they are related. I think that Mr. Collins's argument is way too simplified.

THE COURT: You know, I had a case years ago in which the defendant was charged with commercial loan fraud,

he made false statements to a bank in connection with a real estate project, and then, this is when I was on Team

America, we learned that he had made false statements in connection with some personal loan applications and added those counts to the Indictment. And as I sit here, I can't remember if there was a severance motion, but since Judge Briccetti was representing the guy, I'm pretty sure there was, and Judge Parker, who is now on the Circuit and therefore we know is very smart, kept it all together. And I think it was a very simple argument: False statements to a bank to get a loan, it's of similar character, even though one was business and one was personal. So why isn't the personal advantage even though one was business and one was personal.

MS. ATTIAS: Judge, they, of course, that's the underlying theme, is that they're all false statements to a Court for personal advantage. I don't know a client of mine ever in 20 and a half years didn't do something for his personal advantage, unless it happened to be a violent crime of passion. Other than that, I can't really remember any.

So I think that connection, just allegedly making false statements to benefit himself financially, whether he was not spending or making, I just --

THE COURT: Making false statements to a Court --

MS. ATTIAS: Right.

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THE COURT: -- just like making false loan applications to a bank.

MS. ATTIAS: Judge, I think it's not enough. obviously don't dispute that connection between the charges but I think it's not enough. And that brings us back to something you said at the very beginning of this morning's conference, which is, in terms of cleanly trying the underlying counts, this makes it potentially messy. Since there's going to have to be another trial on the contempt, then you know we're not even really wasting court resources if the two were tried together, and although the record could be cleared as much as possible so that it was clear to the jury that it was not this Court that he allegedly lied to, it's kind of hard to know that that's going to go really well and at some point -- I mean, I'm sure that, even if we just say "The Judge, The Judge, The Judge," they're going to be kind of wondering why the judge has no name, and I just think that on the most practical level, as long as there has to be another trial, why not spend another five hours on the perjury count and have one clean trial on the underlying crimes and a clean trial on the other count?

And I have to tell you that before we go much further, I just have to bring up one subject about dates of trials based on some new information I learned yesterday

morning and confirmed yesterday evening, and that sort of, the reason I bring it up now, as I stand here cringing, is I believe that we can still try a case on May 21, but I now, as of yesterday evening's confirmation of some information Mr. Collins shared with me yesterday morning, I do not believe that it can be the underlying crime portion of the case, and I'll tell you why.

Mr. Collins has been very cooperative, we've had a very good working relationship throughout the course of the very few months that I've had this case, and yesterday morning, just in a long conversation, amongst other things he said, by the way, do you know about those massive number of boxes from when Mr. Bartok's office was originally searched in 2010 before there were any criminal charges brought?

And I said, excuse me? No. Don't know anything about this.

Apparently when Inspector Marsh searched his office, they seized a large part of the contents of his office, files, anything down to phone messages, basically everything. Then David Wikstrom, Mr. Bartok's first attorney, arranged with the government to have everything copied at huge expense, in the area of \$10,000, in August of 2010.

At first Mr. Collins thought, his memory, I'm glad

it was incorrect, there were 52 boxes. Mr. Turk tells me 1 2 this morning there were 32 boxes. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Wikstrom had them copied? 4 MS. ATTIAS: Had them copied. 5 THE COURT: So where are they? 6 MS. ATTIAS: Fifteen boxes were returned to 7 Mr. Bartok sometime in August of 2010, but as of this morning, Mr. Bartok, this is the first time when I went down 8 9 to the Marshal's office since I spoke to Mr. Wikstrom last 10 night at about eight o'clock, this morning when he came into the building at about 9:15 to 9:20, I went downstairs and 11 12 spoke to him. He does not, at this time, have any idea 13 where those boxes are. He does not have a clear memory of 14 the boxes being returned. I have not yet had the 15 opportunity to speak to Mrs. Bartok to see if she knows 16 where the boxes are. 17 THE COURT: I'm confused. Mr. Wikstrom had 32 18 boxes copied and he said he gave 15 to Mr. Bartok. 19 MS. ATTIAS: Yes. 20 THE COURT: Where are the other 17? 21 MS. ATTIAS: I don't know. What he told me last 22 night on the phone is that there was a ton of material 23 seized, and he returned some of it to Mr. Bartok. Now I do 24 believe that there are two copies, and this is just from

this morning speaking to Mr. Collins, Inspector Marsh may

have the originals that were seized and --1 2 THE COURT: I hope he does. 3 MS. ATTIAS: And the government appears to have a 4 copy in the basement of this building. So, whether or not I 5 can locate those boxes -- make believe I can get them this 6 afternoon, 32 boxes, even make believe it was 15 boxes, on 7 top of what I'm dealing with now, Judge, makes for a very ineffective defense in five weeks. 8 9 THE COURT: Depends what's in them. 10 MS. ATTIAS: But how does one --11 THE COURT: If 28 of them are clients who aren't 12 going to be part of this case, could be files going back 13 years that aren't covered by this case. 14 MS. ATTIAS: A lot of them could be absolute 15 garbage, but until I look at them, I don't know. And if the 16 government has them, I need to have them and look at them. 17 So here's --18 THE COURT: Well, look, you know my schedule. 19 You've got a detained client. If we don't do this May 21, 20 time I have put aside for a long time, I don't know when the 21 hell we're going to be able to do it. If it's a three-day 22 drug case, I can get somebody else to take it. Nobody see 23 taking a three-week fraud case. 24 So, before freaking out, I think the first thing

is somebody has to get you to those boxes. If they're in

this building or in Mr. Marsh's office, that should be doable as soon as you have the time.

And does Mr. Collins or Mr. Alberts have any idea what's in them?

MR. COLLINS: I do. So, just so I understand, have we moved away now from the severance argument to discovery issues or do I get to go back?

MS. ATTIAS: Well, I just want to --

THE COURT: You get to go back to. Well, let me just say, going back to severance, even if I severed Count Eight, I might very well let it in under 404(b). So, I don't know that the efficiency argument is furthered. I also don't know that I would let it in under 404(b), it would depend somewhat on what the defense is in this case, and I don't know what it is. But I don't want either side to think that even if I, that if I sever, that presages what I would do under 404(b).

Let us assume for the remainder of this severance argument that these boxes will end up being not important or something that you can get through in the next six weeks.

MS. ATTIAS: This is what begs the question. They may be nothing, but somebody has to look at them and somebody has to prepare this case for trial and somebody has to do all of the written submissions before trial, and you might notice that I am standing here alone at counsel table.

1 My downtown office appears to have some staffing 2 complications, and all I can say about that is I am 3 currently alone on this case. 4 THE COURT: No, I get that. 5 MS. ATTIAS: So even --6 THE COURT: Let's finish talking about the 7 severance, and we'll talk about the -- if I understand what 8 you were going to propose, you were going to propose the 9 Count Eight and Ten trial from May 21 and the big trial for 10 some other time. 11 MS. ATTIAS: This is why we get along, Judge. 12 of the many reasons. 13 THE COURT: But is there anything more you want to 14 say on the legal point of whether Count Eight is properly 15 charged? 16 MS. ATTIAS: No, I think I said everything I have 17 to. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Collins, do you want to say 19 anything more about Count Eight? 20 MR. COLLINS: Very briefly, your Honor. 21 one of the points was the one you alluded to, which is, I 22 don't think there's any savings of judicial efficiency 23 because we would strongly believe that, even if Count Eight was severed -- and still with regard to Count Ten, with 24 25 regard to Count Ten, as I've made clear to Ms. Attias, our

intention is to offer that evidence under 404(b), as we set 1 2 forth in the brief, and the same with regard to Count Ten --3 to Count Eight. 4 THE COURT: What is the your theory, the 404(b) 5 theory? 6 MR. COLLINS: With regard to Count Eight or Count 7 Ten? 8 THE COURT: Either. 9 MR. COLLINS: With regard to Count Eight, Count 10 Eight is set forth in the brief is that my understanding, at 11 least my understanding as of now, is that intent or 12 knowledge or absence of mistake is going to be is a issue at 13 trial and, therefore, as a result, the fact that, as charged 14 in the Indictment, specifically as we've talked about 15 previously that, with regard to Count Six, that Mr. Bartok 16 made false statements to the Court, it's highly relevant 17 that with regard to Count Eight that, as said beforehand, I 18 don't mean to repeat myself, that there are false statements 19 made to another federal judge. 20 And, in addition, going back to the only other 21 point I want to cover with regard to Ms. Attias made, 22 Ms. Attias seemed to draw a very fine line between that 23 Mr. Bartok's frauds were for his personal advantage but

Count Eight was for the minimization of payments.

THE COURT: I think she was saying it doesn't

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matter, every fraud is to benefit the fraudster, so I shouldn't draw that distinction. I think that's what she was saying.

MR. COLLINS: But that's the point. And that goes to -- and not to say that Ms. Attias's actually made the Government's point, but in an indirect way she actually did because, again, they are two, they're both frauds.

Mr. Bartok's initial frauds as charged in the Indictment, and a fraud upon the Bankruptcy Court and a fraud upon the Court in order to gain personal advantage.

THE COURT: That's clearly not enough. I know Ruiz uses that phrase, "substantial alleged dishonesty," but that is clearly not enough. Two unrelated frauds having in common only the defendant being the perpetrator I don't think are properly joined under Rule 8(a). There needs to be some additional connection. And the question in my mind — even under Ruiz, that would not fly. Just like it didn't fly under Kerik.

The question is, does the fact that these frauds were perpetrated using the same means, false statements to federal courts, give you the something extra or does the something extra have to be what it was in Ruiz and Werner and Josephberg and the cases the defendant cites, which is the two frauds arose out of the same entity or the same scheme with some other connection, or is it enough that it's

the same kind of fraud, such as it was enough that it was a false statement to a bank for a commercial loan and a false statement to a different bank for a personal loan or that somebody committed income tax fraud by underreporting their income and they also did it by inflating their expenses? That's the question.

MR. COLLINS: Same kind of fraud committed against the same entity, the United States Courts, United States

Judges, by the same individual. Rule 8 is not about drawing exceedingly fine lines, it's why the rule, it's why Ruiz

uses the term "substantial alleged dishonesty" and Rule 8 itself, the statutory language, is same or similar character.

Clearly, again, your Honor, if somebody was to, if somebody was to walk down Main Street in White Plains and they were to rob the Citibank across from the Wal-Mart on April 5th, today, and two months later they were to go one block away to rob the Chase Bank, which is a block away, it's the same crime, it's bank robbery, it's the same victim, it's the FDIC. It shouldn't make a difference that it's a different financial institution or that in one instance that the person may have claimed that they have a bomb, the defendant may have claimed they have a bomb or another instance he may have shown the toy pistol. Just because there are differences between the crimes committed

on different days, there's timing differences, in that 1 2 instance, it's essentially the same crime, perhaps committed by a different means against the same type of entity. No 3 different than what occurred here. 4 5 THE COURT: Do you think if you had the Madoff 6 case and you learned that Madoff, in addition to everything 7 else, was paying his nanny off the books, that you could join the nanny tax with the Ponzi scheme? 8 9 That's the sort of question a Second Circuit Judge 10 would ask. I don't usually do that, but I'm actually 11 curious to know the answer. MR. COLLINS: It is, and I'm glad I'm neither 12 13 Mr. Litt nor Ms. Baroni. 14 Well -- I'm sorry, but those are two -- the nanny, 15 I'm sorry the nanny tax and the securities fraud is what you're --16 17 MS. ATTIAS: Do you want me to draw you a picture? 18 MR. COLLINS: I understand your Honor's question 19 but that's -- unfortunately, your Honor, while I understand 20 the question and the hypothetical, to use an old phrase, 21 that's not what's going on here. 22 THE COURT: All right, let me change it. Let me 23 change it. You have Madoff, he's running a huge Ponzi 24 scheme and he's also, for the employees of that business,

he's not paying the proper payroll tax.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ COLLINS: Yes, because that was essentially, that was the same --

THE COURT: It's from the same company, right.

MR. COLLINS: That was the same, that's the case I tried before Judge Preska in which there was a bank fraud involving Tollman-Hundley hotels, and it turned out that the entity was committing tax fraud by not properly paying its payroll taxes, so I most assuredly say, yes.

THE COURT: Right. And our case is somewhere between the two examples I just raised; right? Because it's not 100 percent unrelated as in the first example in that it has the similarity -- well, I take it back. It's 100 percent unrelated as in the first example in that the lie on the financial affidavit didn't further the business in the least, but there's a similarity in that here it is an unrelated lie but it is a lie involving -- it is a very similar, it has a very similar character in that it is a lie to a Court. So it kind of comes down to whether similar character means just the means of committing the offense or if it means the purpose of the offense. It's not all that clear.

MS. ATTIAS: Judge, I already sort of said this, but I think, as I was writing the motion, I saw that obviously the two counts felt quite different in terms of the severance argument, but if it's really not that clear,

then why muddy a trial? And I just don't see the practical purpose for going there, and I think that that's very important.

And, in fact, under Mr. Collins's advising the Court, and of course he and I have already begun to discuss this, that he'll be moving for the information to come in under 404(b) anyway, I'm not so sure it is admissible. It might be so closely related that it really shouldn't be admitted, but you know it might be too closely related and muddy things even further.

THE COURT: Well, that would cut the other way.

MR. COLLINS: I --

THE COURT: Look, even the Werner case, which is a very good case for the government because it sort of undid a lot of the damage that the Halpert case did to the government. Even in Werner they do say, similar character means a general likeness, but then they go on to say, while the stolen property offense and the robbery offense were of similar character, they say, well, they both arose from the defendant's position as an insider at the Lufthansa terminal, and the defendant was emboldened by his successful theft to get involved in the robbery. So even there where they're saying similar character just means general likeness, they go on to discuss the existence of a substantive connection beyond just the means. If it were

enough that both were property being taken, if it were enough to be of similar character, one was a robbery, one was a theft, property were being taken, they wouldn't have bothered saying both arose from a defendant being an insider who worked at the Lufthansa terminal.

And in *Ruiz*, if it was enough that the false loan application and the perjury both involved false statements, they wouldn't have said both involved false statements and arose from the operation of the same entity.

So although I agree that there's something bizarre about the notion that a false statement to the District

Court and the false statement to the Bankruptcy Court wouldn't be of similar character, it seems like all the cases that discuss similar character regard it as being something more than just a similar means, they look for some substantive question, even that Seventh Circuit case,

Alexander, they tied themselves in knots to say, well, the false statement on the mortgage application and the false statements in the bankruptcy kept him in the apartment out of which he was running the other scheme. If it was enough that they were false statement crimes, the Seventh Circuit wouldn't have had to tie itself up in knots.

So even though I think it's by no means clear, I'm going to grant the motion to sever Count Eight as well, and I will absolutely consider any 404(b) application, and so

this may end up having little practical effect; but I think under the law I have to look at Rule 8 and whether something's properly joined without considering whether it might be admissible under 404(b). I think it's similar enough to be admitted under 404(b), but I don't know that the standards under 404(b) and Rule 8(a) are the same. And I don't have a good enough feeling as to what the defense is going to be in this case to know whether I'll admit under 404(b), and if I do, and if that's the right decision --well, if I had denied this motion, on appeal the government would argue, well, it would have come in under 404(b) anyway and it's harmless, but I don't know if it's coming in under 404(b), and I'm not doing a harmless error analysis, I'm just looking at Rule 8. So that's my ruling.

I will add that the recusal motion the government consents to in part and consents to it for Count Ten. As to Count Eight, it's meritless. The government correctly sets forth the legal standards. My views and the comments to which defense counsel cites all arose from court proceedings. There's nothing extrajudicial that I know about Mr. Bartok. So what I have observed in Court is not a proper basis for recusal. And, in any event, I don't think any reasonable informed person would find my comments sufficient to raise significant doubt as to my impartiality given the record before me when I made the comments and the

fact that the Court of Appeals recently affirmed my ruling revoking Mr. Bartok's bail, and that they did that having reviewed the transcript and apparently not finding any problem, I think a reasonable person would not find that my action in revoking the bail or what I said about it to be evidence of bias or lack of impartiality.

As a practical matter, however, if Count Eight is going to be tried with Count Ten and Count Ten is going to be tried by another judge, it doesn't make sense, and that judge can't be me, it doesn't make sense to have separate trials on Count Eight and Count Ten. So it may end up being that Mr. Bartok gets another judge for both Counts Eight and Ten just because that's practical.

Now going back to discovery. Tell me what you know about these boxes, Mr. Collins.

MR. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor. The boxes, the boxes were first mentioned in the very first discovery letter, and as Ms. Attias says, they were copied by his prior counsel a couple generations ago. As to what has happened with Mr. Bartok's set, I rely upon what Ms. Attias says.

THE COURT: Let me interrupt one second.

Mr. Wikstrom was retained?

MR. COLLINS: He was retained.

THE COURT: So he had this very expensive copying

job done and now we're not sure where the boxes are. That's 1 2 great. Go ahead. MR. COLLINS: I apologize, your Honor. 3 4 THE COURT: No, I interrupted you. 5 MR. COLLINS: I don't have any information on that 6 other than what Ms. Attias has said. 7 We have the originals, as Ms. Attias indicated, 8 and we also have our working copy, which is in the basement. 9 And subject to both sides trying to get done what they need 10 to get done, we would obviously make the working copies, the 11 working copies available. 12 That being said, it's not our present intention to 13 use -- we'll be using some documents, some of the documents, 14 your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Can you give us a general idea of what 16 those documents consist of? 17 MR. COLLINS: Customer files, bank records and 18 court filings. 19 THE COURT: And have you identified for the 20 defense what clients are going to be the subject of 21 testimony at trial? 22 MR. COLLINS: Yes. We've identified, well, we've identified clients -- we've identified the individuals, all 23 24 of the individuals in the Indictment. 25 THE COURT: And are you going to be proving up

clients beyond the ones discussed in the Indictment? 1 2 MR. COLLINS: We may be dealing, your Honor, with other filings that are problematic. As I've done with 3 Ms. Attias, I've been very proactive in terms of identifying 4 5 issues. 6 THE COURT: Well, if you, I mean, let's say there 7 are, I'm making this up, I don't know, there are six clients 8 identified in the Indictment; is that right? 9 MR. COLLINS: Eight. 10 THE COURT: Eight. All right. 11 MR. COLLINS: Seven and one potential client. THE COURT: And she knows who those eight are? 12 13 MR. COLLINS: She does. 14 THE COURT: But if you're going to be proving up 15 either additional clients or through a summary witness 16 saying, I went through 100 files and in 66 of them I found 17 X, you need to tell her those specifics as well if you 18 expect her to be ready by May 21. 19 MR. COLLINS: We do expect summary testimony. 20 do expect summary testimony based upon the payment cards of 21 Revelations showing the money that's going in, but obviously 22 with regard to a summary witness, it's not only the charts 23 but the underlying documents that we would have to mark. 24 we would be obviously letting her know that.

THE COURT: Well, I guess I'm a little confused

Are you going to be having some sort of summary 1 2 witness who's going to talk about large numbers of clients? MR. COLLINS: Not the filing details or 3 Mr. Bartok's conversations with them, but with regard to 4 5 what the payment cards show, what the business records of 6 Revelations show as to what Revelations was taking in during 7 specified periods of time. 8 THE COURT: Well, if you're not proving that there 9 was anything fraudulent, let's say you have a chart with 200 10 customers, if you're only proving that eight of them are 11 frauds, then what's the relevance of the other 192? 12 MR. COLLINS: Because we expect there will be 13 testimony from individuals that worked at Revelations. 14 THE COURT: That the whole thing, that everybody was a fraud, it was saturated with fraud? 15 16 MR. COLLINS: That it was saturated with fraud, 17 your Honor. THE COURT: And this evidence is going to come not 18 19 from the individual client files but from some other payment 20 records? 21 MR. COLLINS: Well, there will be the payment 22 Revelations kept essentially index cards that 23 showed the amount of money that individuals were paying for 24 services both as an initial fee and as monthly, and as

monthly installments until an individual was no longer with

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Revelations.
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               THE COURT: And are those index cards in the
     individual client file?
 3
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               MR. COLLINS: No.
 5
               THE COURT: So --
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               MR. COLLINS: They were kept, my understanding is
 7
     they were kept separately essentially in a safe.
 8
               THE COURT: So Ms. Attias can just look at those
 9
     underlying records and compare it to your chart, she doesn't
10
     need to go into the individual client files to do that?
11
               MS. ATTIAS: Well, Judge, I mean, this brings
12
     me --
13
               THE COURT: That doesn't mean that you wouldn't
14
     want to.
15
               MR. COLLINS: But those, and just to go back, the
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     payment cards have already been provided in discovery, so I
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     don't think we're actually talking -- if we're still talking
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     about the boxes, then I don't believe that we're actually
19
     talking about something that Ms. Attias has to investigate
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     anew by going to the boxes because it's already part of the
21
     discovery provided.
22
               THE COURT: But, you know, she's trying to do her
23
     homework and --
24
               MR. COLLINS: Of course.
25
               THE COURT: -- she thinks she needs to go through
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1 the boxes.

Here's what I want to do. I'm extremely reluctant to move this trial just because --

MS. ATTIAS: Just because 32 boxes appeared yesterday?

THE COURT: Just because the next available time I have is a year from now, and I don't want Mr. Bartok sitting in the pokey for a year. And that's literally. Because I have a trial April 23, then I have this one. The moment this one is over, I have what is billed as an eight-week trial, maybe it will end up being shorter. The moment that's over, I have a one-week trial. Then I'm trying to take a week or two off. Then right after Labor Day, I have a four-week trial, immediately followed by a three-week trial, immediately followed by a five-week trial, immediately followed by a five-week trial in January of 2013.

The only possibility I would have is, and those are all criminal except for a five-week civil trial in November, so if I had to, I would put this case in there. It's going to be very hard to find somebody who could try this case in my place, although, if need be, I will do it, but I'm not going to move anything yet.

The government should make the boxes available to Ms. Attias right away. And, Ms. Attias, as soon as you have

1 a moment, go down and look at those boxes. Maybe when you see them, you will conclude that there's really only three 2 or four that are going to be relevant or that you don't need 3 to go through the client file for every single, solitary 4 5 client. But, if you come back and you say you do, we'll 6 figure something out then. 7 So let's come back in whatever timeframe you think 8 is reasonable for you to be able to tell me that you've 9 flipped through those boxes and you have a sense of what's 10 in them and what you need to do. 11 MS. ATTIAS: Judge, I am not working tomorrow and 12 Monday, so we can perhaps, I don't know, I have another plea 13 before you this afternoon, but perhaps, you know, for a hour 14 I can start going downstairs now, and I can resume on 15 Tuesday. I can probably report in to you just from within 16 literally a hour downstairs in the basement just looking at

them, opening up the first ten boxes, I can probably get some clue. If I can tell you by the middle of next week, if I'm back in the office on Tuesday, which I am, I can probably tell you by Wednesday.

THE COURT: I'm not here next week Wednesday through Friday, so what about --

> MS. ATTIAS: Can I have just a second, Judge? THE COURT: Yes.

(Counsel confer)

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THE COURT: I was going to suggest also that maybe 1 2 Mr. Burke could be your tour guide through the boxes since he seems to be the one who knows what's in them. 3 4 MS. ATTIAS: That would be lovely, Judge, and I 5 don't have a plea till 2:45 in a case with you. I am 6 willing to spend the next the hours looking at the boxes. 7 That would be great. THE COURT: 8 MS. ATTIAS: We can maybe put this on for second 9 call. Believe me, if there's a way I can try this, I would 10 like to get this done. I know that he's incarcerated, and 11 everybody has been putting a lot of time in, but I need to 12 do the right job. 13 THE COURT: I agree with everything you just said, 14 and if it turns out that either I have to move my civil case 15 for November or I have to find some saint of a senior judge 16 or somebody to help me out, I will. 17 There was also that, of course, that MS. ATTIAS: 18 little funky idea of trying the cases backwards. It might 19 feel backwards, but perhaps it's not backwards, I don't 20 know. But just another option. But I think that if I came 21 back before you, either just before my plea at 2:45 or just 22 after that, I could tell you where things stand. 23 THE COURT: Let me ask Ms. Cama what else we have 24 this afternoon.

MR. COLLINS: Can I just go back? I'm not -- just

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     so I understand it, trying them in reverse actually doesn't
 2
     involve --
 3
               THE COURT: Doesn't involve me.
 4
               MS. ATTIAS: Right.
 5
               MR. COLLINS: So I'm not sure it actually involves
 6
     your schedule.
 7
               THE COURT: Right. Well, the government can think
 8
     about whether it wants to try them backwards. I will leave
 9
     it up to the government which set of charges it wants to go
10
     first.
11
               All right. So why don't we reconvene at 3:15 and
12
     I'll get a better feel.
13
               MR. COLLINS: Your Honor, I apologize,
14
     unfortunately, is it okay if just Mr. Alberts appears for
15
     the government?
16
               THE COURT: Of course.
               MR. COLLINS: Thank you. And we've had some time
17
18
     to contemplate your Honor's question, and our preference is
19
     the fraud trial go first.
20
               THE COURT: I'm shocked.
21
               MS. ATTIAS: Judge, so we've concluded all the
22
     business that we've taken up so far this morning?
23
               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
24
               MS. ATTIAS: There's a little bit more.
25
               THE COURT: Okay.
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MS. ATTIAS: But, I'm sorry, before we do that, I 1 2 was trying to understand your actual ruling on the recusal motion as to Count Eight. I understand everything you said 3 about of course you can be impartial, I just didn't quite --4 I was thinking that I hadn't quite heard a decision I 5 6 thought. 7 THE COURT: The recusal motion is denied. I don't 8 think there's any legal basis for it. My views arise all 9 from in-court proceedings, and if they didn't, I don't think 10 my impartiality could reasonably be questioned; however, it 11 sounds like everybody agrees Eight and Ten should be tried together, and Ten is going to be tried by somebody else. 12 13 So, as a practical matter, Eight will also be 14 tried by somebody else, not because there's any legal 15 requirement that that be done but just for the sake of 16 efficiency. 17 MS. ATTIAS: That is what I thought I heard you 18 say. 19 THE COURT: All right. Anything more? 20 MS. ATTIAS: Yes, Judge, I have left a message 21 for -- there's the issue of the car sale. 22 Oh, the car, that's right. The last I THE COURT: heard, and we should make a record here. 23 24 Ms. Attias and I have actually spoken about the

car and some difficulty she was having in getting the CJA

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office to take -- since the check was made out to
Mr. Bartok, my idea was to have him endorse it over to the
Clerk of the Court. CJA people said they couldn't take a
check like that. I asked if they would just this once, and
it turns out they can take the check. That's where we left
it.
          Do they have the check?
                       They do not have the check, Judge.
          MS. ATTIAS:
          THE COURT: Where is the check?
          MS. ATTIAS: The check is on this table sitting
two inches away from me.
          THE COURT: And why is it still here?
          MS. ATTIAS: Because it has yet been unsigned with
that particular required endorsement over to the US Courts
Southern District of New York, as Tracy Miller, the CJA
clerk downtown, informed both your Honor and myself needed
to be. I could not make it myself to Valhalla the other
day, so my assistant went over there with the check.
Mr. Bartok expressed some displeasure at having to sign the
check in such a manner.
          I spoke to him this morning in the pens, and I do
not believe he is going to sign that check. So I
therefore --
          THE COURT: Is there a reason?
          MS. ATTIAS: None that I can express to your
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1 Honor.

THE COURT: Does Mr. Bartok understand that that refusal is likely to result in another contempt of court charge?

MS. ATTIAS: I haven't had that exact discussion with him, but I do believe that he understands that that is a possibility.

So, in an effort to practically get to the solution required by your Honor's order, I have just before I came up here this morning, I left a message for the car dealer who I've been dealing with who has been very cooperative, asking him to look into the possibility of cutting a new check made out to the party that your Honor has ordered that the money be paid to, that being the US Courts, Southern District of New York.

The reason it was made, I actually had asked him to do that initially, the reason it was made out to Mr. Bartok was because Mr. Bartok was the owner of the car and that's what the business needed to do.

My suggestion to him in that phone message, and I'll find out what happens when I get downstairs, is perhaps an order of the Court would be helpful in his boss's decision about who to cut the check to.

THE COURT: I'm going to order something, but it's going to be different. When we come back at 3:15, if that

check is not signed, I'm going to order Mr. Bartok to sign it. If he doesn't, he'll be in contempt of my order.

Now he's already in jail, so throwing him in jail isn't going to have any coercive effect, and he doesn't have any money, apparently, so fining him isn't going to have any coercive effect, but I will hear from either side about what punishment I could impose that might have some effect, and it is certainly a matter that I would refer to the US Attorney for prosecution if I make such an order and in my presence Mr. Bartok refuses to sign it.

They obviously can charge him if they choose, but you know, if he were at liberty, I would just throw him in jail until he signed it. But throwing him in jail won't do any good here, obviously.

So I'll take the Government's advice on what sort of sanction might make sense if Mr. Bartok refused. But, when we meet later, I'm going to order him to endorse the check as described and if he doesn't --

MS. ATTIAS: Judge, I don't think Mr. Collins is going to need to do his research. Mr. Bartok is endorsing the check right now.

THE COURT: That is wise.

MS. ATTIAS: After he signs his name, Judge, right in front of him I'm going to write out, which I did not want to do before it was signed, I will write in the endorsement

"Pay to the Order of," as Ms. Miller --1 2 THE COURT: I think his signature needs to be below that writing, so I don't know where he signed the 3 check, but he can sign it again below that writing, if need 4 5 be. 6 MS. ATTIAS: You know, so far in this case I've 7 been a car dealer and now I'm a banker. So can I have a 8 second, please just to take a look at this? 9 THE COURT: Sure. 10 MS. ATTIAS: I'm going to hand write it in, I'm 11 going to have him sign it again in two places. 12 THE COURT: Sounds good. 13 (Pause) 14 MS. ATTIAS: Your Honor, I am now prepared to put 15 the proverbial check in the mail. 16 THE COURT: Excellent. Glad that issue is off the 17 The only dangling issue with respect to the money is 18 whether Mr. Till has, in fact, submitted his CJA voucher. 19 Do you know? 20 MS. ATTIAS: I've been in touch with him. 21 that what happened was that when he was asked by your Honor 22 to give a reckoning of the time that he had spent on the 23 case, he believed that was the CJA bill, from everything I 24 can see. 25 THE COURT: So is he now going to --

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MS. ATTIAS: So his office is going to be dealing
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 2
     with that.
               THE COURT: So he'll be submitting a voucher.
 3
               MS. ATTIAS: As I understand, Judge.
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 5
               THE COURT: All right. We will reconvene at 3:15,
 6
     and Ms. Attias, don't, I know you won't, but don't, don't
 7
     pull your punches about what you think the significance of
     these boxes is just because it's a headache for me.
 8
 9
               MS. ATTIAS: I have no hesitation doing it.
10
               THE COURT: If you need the time, you tell me.
11
               MS. ATTIAS: Thank you. You can join me in my
12
     headache. I bought a new bottle of aspirin in my office.
13
               MR. COLLINS: Before we actually go, I actually
14
     have some minor housekeeping issues.
15
               THE COURT: Okay. Also I should put on the record
16
     that the co-defendants have been given permission not to
17
     attend since the motions that were on for today involved the
     S4 Indictment in which they were not named.
18
19
               Okay, go ahead, Mr. Collins.
20
               MR. COLLINS: I think actually Ms. Attias realized
21
     she had one more issue.
22
               THE COURT: Oh, okay.
23
               MS. ATTIAS: Back a while ago, when I first came
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     into the case in December, a question came up as to during
25
     the filing of the last CJA-23 about whether or not
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Mr. Bartok was yet receiving Social Security benefits.
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 2
     Afterward I did speak to his office, and I learned that the
     checks had just started to come over the last couple of
 3
 4
     months. So your Honor asked me to look into my office
 5
     policy about whether we would be looking to recover part of
 6
     the cost of representation through Social Security, and the
 7
     answer is, no, we are absolutely not looking to take away
 8
     his Social Security money. Not a penny of it.
 9
               THE COURT: How much is the Social Security?
10
               MS. ATTIAS: 1350 to $1,400 a month, Judge.
11
               THE COURT: And is that his wife's only source of
12
     income?
13
               MS. ATTIAS: She is working for two different
14
     stores making I think minimum wage and working very long
15
     hours.
16
               THE COURT: Like in retail?
               MS. ATTIAS: Yes. Yes.
17
18
               THE COURT: All right. I don't see any need to
     order anything to be done with the $1,400 a month.
19
20
               Does the government disagree?
21
               MR. COLLINS:
22
               THE COURT: All right. Anything else from
23
     defendant?
24
               MS. ATTIAS: No, Judge.
25
               THE COURT: Mr. Collins.
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MR. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor, we would ask that 1 2 your Honor set an acceptance of responsibility date. 3 THE COURT: Well, I'll do that when we have a trial date. 4 5 MR. COLLINS: I thought we had a trial date of 6 It hasn't been adjourned yet. 7 THE COURT: We do, but it might change at 3:15. So, if it doesn't, I will set an acceptance date at 3:15. 8 9 MR. COLLINS: Okay. While I'm here, though, 10 proceeding on the assumption we are going to trial on 11 May 21, can I address two small issues? 12 THE COURT: Okay. MR. COLLINS: The first is, it's my understanding 13 14 that your Honor often does not need sort of standard requests to charge on standard charges. 15 16 THE COURT: I don't, well, I mean, for the 17 offenses, yes, but you could just tell me, I want the charge 18 on similar acts, I want the charge on reasonable doubt. 19 don't need you to give me proposals on anything except the 20 substantive offenses and anything out of the ordinary you 21 would be asking for. 22 MR. COLLINS: Okay. 23 Judge, in that regard, would you, MS. ATTIAS: 24 depending when the trial date is, of course, would I be able 25 to have access to whatever reasonable doubt charge you give

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and maybe a couple of particulars I'm not thinking of right
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 2
     now?
               THE COURT: Sure, like from a previous trial?
 3
 4
               MS. ATTIAS: Yes. If you give a standard
 5
     reasonable doubt charge.
 6
               THE COURT: I think I give the one -- I think it's
 7
     right out of Sand, but, yes, that's no problem, you can ask
 8
     Mr. Levy.
 9
               MS. ATTIAS: Great.
10
               MR. COLLINS: And, also, your Honor, does your
11
     Honor normally sit from 9:30 to 2:00?
12
               THE COURT: Well, when it's a trial of this
13
     length, I usually sit, I usually have the jury from 9:30 to
14
     2:30, and I have counsel, if they have any issues, come at
15
     9:00.
16
               Let me ask Alice, though, are we planning to do
     that for this trial? Have you been putting things on, other
17
18
     things from 3:30 to 5:00 starting May 21?
               THE CLERK: No, I've been doing the upside-down,
19
20
     Judge, 9:30 to 2:30 trial.
21
               THE COURT: So that is what we will do. So if
22
     counsel have any issues, we do it between 9:00 and 9:30, and
     we do 9:30 to 2:30 with a 30-minute break at like, you know,
23
24
     what is it, like 11:45, 11:45, and I tell them to bring a
25
     little something. They shouldn't get starving and lose
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1	their concentration, and I recommend the same for the
2	lawyers.
3	Luckily you all live in the building, so you can
4	go back to your offices to nosh. I've had to let lawyers
5	nosh a little something in the courtroom, which makes the
6	cleaning guys very anxious.
7	If I do have to find somebody else to try this
8	case, it could be in New York City, but we'll cross that
9	bridge when we come to it.
10	Anything else?
11	MR. COLLINS: No, I think we're ready to take our
12	field trip with Ms. Attias.
13	THE COURT: All right. Thank you, everybody. See
14	you at 3:15.
15	(Recess taken at 11:02 a.m. until 3:25 p.m.)
16	THE CLERK: United States against Andrew Bartok.
17	THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon everyone,
18	again. Mr. Alberts, Mr. Collins, Inspector Marsh,
19	Mr. Burke, Ms. Attias, Ms. Katz and Mr. Bartok.
20	Ms. Attias, why don't you fill me in on what you
21	found when you went to see those boxes.
22	MS. ATTIAS: I found 32 boxes with 78,504
23	documents.
24	THE COURT: Oh, dear.
25	MS. ATTIAS: Happily we've been through one box.

We just picked a random box off the shelf and that box was a copy of newspapers, full copies of newspapers that had been in Mr. Bartok's office. So perhaps we'll get pretty lucky. Although I have seen and I will be waiting for a copy, there is apparently a quite detailed index of what's in those 78,000 and a half documents, and it does not look pretty. There are many, many, many, many documents that I'm going to have to actually look at, and Ms. Katz will be starting there, but the absolute truth of it, Judge, in all seriousness is I cannot imagine competently and effectively trying this case with that unfortunate discovery and what's in the basement of the building, I cannot imagine trying this in May.

So, of course, part of my conversation with Mr. Bartok and Ms. Katz was downstairs with him while we were just doing the last case, was that whether he would be okay with the additional time it would take for me to fully prep his case because, of course, he is incarcerated, and he did hear this morning that the next possible date we were looking at was probably November.

THE COURT: I have an alternative.

MS. ATTIAS: Okay.

THE COURT: Actually, I took the opportunity of the interregnum between part one and part two of this conference to inquire whether the eight-week trial currently

set for June 11 was really going to be eight weeks, and I was told that it is likely to be no more than six. I guess the government is expecting some dispositions. So I can do this trial July 23, if you guys can do it.

I have another case set for August 6, but if that doesn't go away, I should be able to find somebody to do that one, because that's a short one. So how is July 23?

MS. ATTIAS: Judge, I actually have two weeks of vacation scheduled immediately before then with my various offsprings' schedules that was what we had sort of written in stone a while ago.

THE COURT: We could try July 23 and just get all the pretrial stuff out of the way the first week in July.

MS. ATTIAS: I don't think that I can take vacation for the two weeks before trial.

THE COURT: Well you can pretend the trial's

July 9 and get all ready and then go. I mean, I hate to

have Mr. Bartok have to wait four months because of vacation

schedules. I mean, look, I know it's not easy to go from

vacation mode right into trial mode, but if we got all the

pretrial stuff out of the way by July 6, then you could take

your two weeks and we can start -- excuse me, I don't mean

July 6, I mean June 29. You're going to be away the weeks

of the 2nd and the 9th. No, no, I'm backwards, I'm sorry.

Go back to what I was saying. If we started the 23rd, we

could just get all the pretrial stuff out of the way by 1 July 6 and you would have the weeks of the 9th and the 16th 2 for your vacation. I understand it's not ideal, but if you 3 are actually in the building July 23, I hate to put this off 4 till November. 5 6 MS. ATTIAS: I hear what you're saying, Judge. 7 puts me into an almost impossible personal situation, and I will just tell you that the two weeks before my vacation, 8 9 Ms. Brody is out of the office and I'm alone in the office 10 for two weeks staffing the entire courthouse. 11 THE COURT: Well, somebody from the big city will come and help. 12 13 MS. ATTIAS: I'm sure. 14 THE COURT: They'll have to, because you're going 15 to be busy prepping for trial. 16 Look, what I'm proposing is we're just going to 17 pretend like the weeks of the 9th and the 16th don't exist. 18 We're going to get completely ready to go by July 6 and then 19 we're just not going to start till the 23rd. 20 MS. ATTIAS: I'm sorry, I just noticed that we put 21 a sentencing on for that week ten minutes ago. I'm sorry, 22 I'm not thinking clearly. 23 THE COURT: That's fine. 24 THE CLERK: We'll finish up at 2:30. 25 THE COURT: We'll finish the trial at 2:30 and

do --1 2 MS. ATTIAS: No, no, during the week that I'm out. During one of my out weeks. 3 So it was either start July 23 or start July 23; 4 5 those are the two options? 6 THE COURT: That's kind of where I'm at. And I 7 don't want to ruin your vacation, but I feel like, if we get 8 everything, everybody is all set to go by July 6, then you 9 go, you take your vacation and we'll start picking a jury 10 the 23rd. 11 MS. ATTIAS: Could we step up to sidebar for a 12 minute, please? 13 THE COURT: Yes. 14 (Discussion at sidebar off the record) 15 THE COURT: All right. We are back on the record, and although I hate to mess with Ms. Attias's plans, I 16 17 think, sad to say, it is the right thing to do given the length of time that Mr. Bartok would otherwise have to wait. 18 19 So, we will have jury selection and trial July 23, 20 but we're going to have all the pretrial litigation 21 completed by July 6. 22 So let me ask Ms. Cama for a date for a final pretrial conference the week of July 2, hopefully the jury 23 24 will have my previous case by then. 25 THE CLERK: July 5, 10 a.m.

THE COURT: Yes. I think we could be reasonably 1 2 confident that the jury will -- wait, hold on. I don't 3 think the jury will have the case by then, we better do it --4 5 THE CLERK: Want to do it 3:30? 6 THE COURT: Yes, 3:30 p.m. 7 THE CLERK: 3:30. July 5. THE COURT: That will be our final pretrial 8 9 conference. Now let's work backwards from the dates I had 10 previously set. I had previously said the government was 11 going to turn over 3500 May 14, which is a week ahead. 12 Because of Ms. Attias's vacation, it will be three weeks ahead. That will be July 2. Government exhibits is going 13 14 to be a week before that, which would be June 25. June 14 15 for motions in limine and June 21 for opposition and 16 requests to charge and voir dire questions also June 21. 17 We'll exclude the time between now and July 23 18 under the Speedy Trial Act. I find the ends of justice 19 served by the exclusion outweigh the best interests of the 20 public and the defendant in a speedy trial because it will 21 enable Ms. Attias to be prepared and will give her time, 22 with the help of Ms. Katz, to review not newly discovered 23 but newly appreciated 32 boxes. The government has 24 represented that it will provide an index of the boxes and

be of whatever assistance it can be in streamlining that

1 process.

Anything else we ought to do now?

MR. ALBERTS: One thing I just wanted to clarify for the record, I know that Ms. Attias appreciates this, but the index that we're providing to her is actually an index of the cabinets that were searched at the original location. We understand that they correspondence to the boxes, but they don't, on the index itself, it doesn't identify what box it goes to. The first step in locating them is going to be matching up the inventories with the boxes. So it's not technically an inventory of the boxes themselves as we determined this morning. But our understanding is it should be a matter of opening the box and finding which index the box corresponds to.

THE COURT: Mr. Burke is waving. It sounds like maybe he and Ms. Attias or he and Ms. Katz --

MS. ATTIAS: Can we go off for a second?

THE COURT: Let me finish my sentence. Will be able to put two and two together.

(Counsel confer)

MR. ALBERTS: Mr. Burke just wanted to make sure that you understood that the items that we originally or the postal agents originally seized they were copied by a third-party vendor. We're not sure how they did it. So the inventory we have is what Postal seized. We assume they

copied it in some rational manner, but we have never gone through the boxes to confirm that they correspond to the index that they have. That's an assumption.

THE COURT: Maybe Ms. Attias is going to find the smoking gun in there that you guys haven't found or whatever the opposite of a smoking gun is.

MS. ATTIAS: Or shoot myself with it. Shoot myself with a smoking gun.

THE COURT: I think we all understand what the inventory is, an inventory of what was seized at the sight of the search warrant, it's not an inventory of what's in the boxes, but we are hopeful the boxes bear some rational relationship to where they were seized from and it wasn't just a 52 pick-up at the third-party vendor.

And, Mr. Alberts, I know I'm messing with your trial schedule, but maybe you can do the July 9 one and give away the July 16 or something. But this case being a longer and more complicated one, I'm sorry that I had to inconvenience both sides a little bit to get it tried in some sort of reasonable timeframe, but with Mr. Bartok being detained, this seems like it's the only real way to do it.

Anything more we should do now?

MS. ATTIAS: Judge, just one piece of business. I did have a discussion with Mr. Collins where I had been looking at the index of the Bates stamped materials that I

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have been given and the index goes through, the Government's
index, and they've been, they have shared it with me and
prior counsel, goes through about 29,000, but the documents
go through about 36,000.
          So, really?
          MR. COLLINS: 29? I apologize, your Honor, I
thought she only needed from September on.
          MS. ATTIAS: I'm missing 29,000 to 32,000
something.
          MR. COLLINS: I can fix that, but obviously we're
trying to, as the Court noted, we're trying to streamline
the process as much as possible. So I misunderstood the
period of time that Ms. Attias needed the index --
          MS. ATTIAS: However --
          MR. COLLINS: -- for. So I need to give her
probably a couple more pages.
          THE COURT: Couple more thousand pages.
          MS. ATTIAS: But we're playing very nicely so far.
          THE COURT: You seem to be working and playing
very nicely together, and I'm sure the Government's not
holing anything back. So I don't foresee you needing my
help with any further discovery issues, but if you do, you
know where to find me.
          MR. COLLINS: And for the record, your Honor,
we're also turning over the document, the boxes inventory
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     which is Bates stamped Index 1 through Index 67 for the
 2
     record.
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               THE COURT: That's the search warrant index and
     not the box index.
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               MR. ALBERTS: Correct, your Honor.
 6
               MS. ATTIAS: Correct.
 7
               THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
 8
               MS. ATTIAS: That's plenty.
 9
               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you folks.
10
               (Proceedings concluded at 3:46 p.m.)
11
                        CERTIFICATE
12
     I, Angela A. O'Donnell, certify that the foregoing is a
13
     correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the
14
     above-entitled matter.
15
16
          Angela A. O'Donnell, RPR, Official Court Reporter
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      United States District Court, Southern District of New York
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